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Fixing California Sentencing Law-The Problem with
Piecemeal Reform
Stephanie Watson
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code §§ 1170, 1170.3 (new, amended, and repealed).
SB 40 (Romero); 2007 STAT. Ch. 3 (Effective March 30, 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cunningham v. California
held California's determinate sentencing law unconstitutional.' The law violated
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the law authorized
a judge-rather than a jury-to find facts that potentially warranted an increased
term. The Court presented California two options with which to remedy its
sentencing system.The first option would allow juries to find the facts on which
to base an upper sentencing term, and the second option would increase the
discretion of the judges to select an appropriate sentencing term.4
Prison reform advocates found that the Cunningham ruling provided a rare
opportunity for thoughtful and effective long-term sentencing reform.5
California's legislature, however, recognized that without a constitutional
sentencing structure in place, chaos would quickly consume the courts.6 Thus, the
Legislature hastily complied with Cunningham in Chapter 3 by increasing
judicial discretion, but did not address long-term prison reform.7 One might ask
whether a prudent response is just as important as a prompt one.'

1. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).
2. Id. ("Because the [determinate sentencing law] authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts
permitting an upper term sentence, the system cannot withstand measurement against our Sixth Amendment
precedent.").
3. Id. ("California may follow the paths taken by its sister States or otherwise alter its system, so long as
the State observes Sixth Amendment limitations declared in this Court's decisions.").
4. See id. (noting that in response to the newly developing Sixth Amendment case law, states have either
required juries to determine any fact that may be used to increase a sentence or granted judges the broad
discretion to determine a sentence within a defined statutory range).
5. B. Cayenne Bird, SB40 Is Not a Prison Sentencing Fix Kill this Bill Now!, AM. CHRON., Mar. 21,
2007, http://www.americanchronicle.conarticles/viewArticle.asp?articlelD=22554 [hereinafter Bird, Kill this
Bill] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("The Supreme Court ruling was a rare ray of hope to everyone
whose lives have been devastated under this harshness."); see also STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR.,
CALIFORNIA SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS: SIGNIFICANT ISSUES 6 (2007), http://www.pewpublicsafety.
org/pdfs/CA%20Sentencing%201ssues.pdf [hereinafter SIGNIFICANT ISSUES] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) ("[S]ome argue that to ensure long-term improvements in the California correction's system, the
Legislature must reconceive its entire scheme of sentencing statutes.").
6.

See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007) (noting that until there

is time for a thorough revision of California sentencing law "this bill would bring desperately needed stability to
a court system that has been thrown into chaos by the Cunningham decision").
7. See 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § I (stating the limited intent of the statute as an answer to Cunningham but
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

California'sPast Sentencing Law

Prior to 1976, California operated under indeterminate sentencing, a
sentencing philosophy driven by rehabilitation. 9 Judges had the "discretion to
impose sentences within broadly defined ranges,"'" which essentially set a
statutory maximum term of confinement." The parole board, however, had the
discretion to permit an inmate's early release.' 2 Policymakers condemned
California's indeterminate sentencing system because it "lack[ed] uniformity,
proportionality, and transparency, and ... unrealistically promot[ed] rehabilitation as [its] primary goal."' 3
In 1976, the California Legislature enacted the Determinate Sentencing Act
(DSA) in response to the perceived failure of rehabilitation and lack of
uniformity of indeterminate sentencing. The DSA described the purpose of
California's new sentencing scheme as punishment rather than rehabilitation."
The DSA increased uniformity in sentencing structure by "limit[ing] [the] range
of sentencing options for each offense"' 6 and by abolishing discretionary parole
release.' Different crimes were divided into prescribed categories, each category
"'

not as sentencing reform); see also Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 (criticizing Senator Romero for responding
only to Cunningham and not long-term prison reform).
8. See Letter from Jeff Adachi, Public Defender, City & County of S.F., to Assembly Member Mark
Leno, Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 20, 2007), in Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 [hereinafter Letter from Adachi
to Leno] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[I]t is also imperative that the state of California chooses
that resolution wisely and with great care.").
9. Kara Dansky, Why CaliforniaNeeds a Sentencing Commission, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.califomia
progressreport.com/2007/0 1/why_califomia.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. Id.; see, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 413, 503 P.2d 921, 922 (1972) (citing the relevant
indeterminate sentence as one year to life for a second offense of indecent exposure).
11. JOSHUA WEINSTEIN, SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA: WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOR THE LITTLE HOOVER
COMMISSION 5 (2006), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/sentencing/WeinsteinJune06.pdf (on file with the

McGeorge Law Review) ("[T]he statutory maximum ....
12. Dansky, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14.

in most cases, meant a life sentence.").

Id.; LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, PUTTING VIOLENCE BEHIND BARS: REDEFINING THE ROLE OF
(1994), http://www.lhc.ca.govlhcdir/l124rp.html [hereinafter BEHIND BARS] (on file

CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS

with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. Dansky, supra note 9; BEHIND BARS, supra note 14.
16. People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1246, 113 P.3d 534, 537 (2005). Judges, however, still retained
some discretion under this system. See CALIFORNIA JUDGES BENCHBOOK: CRIMINAL POSTrRIAL PROCEEDINGS
§ 2.11 (1991).
Under the determinate sentencing law, the judge retains discretion to: (1) grant or deny probation to

an eligible defendant, (2) choose a base term from among the three specified alternate terms, (3)
choose a term for some enhancements from among three specified terms, (4) strike additional
punishment for most enhancements, and (5) determine whether sentences will run concurrently or
consecutively (except when consecutive sentences are mandated by statute).

Id.
17.

Dansky, supra note 9.
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with its own lower, middle, and upper sentencing term." Under the DSA, a
determinate sentence consisted of a base term,' 9 plus conduct enhancements, 0 and
status enhancements'
California's Rules of Court articulated the application of determinate
sentencing law, which further promoted the sentencing scheme's uniformity.22
Before Chapter 3 was passed, California law presumptively imposed the middle
term for a convicted defendant unless aggravating or mitigating factors 23 justified
imposition of the upper or lower term. 24 The Rules of Court identified those
factors and how a judge could use them to determine an appropriate term. 5
any
During a trial's sentencing phase, the defense and prosecution could establish
16
mitigating or aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge
would balance those factors and would depart from the presumptive term when
warranted. 7
B. Supreme Court Sentencing Precedentand Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
California's determinate sentencing scheme operated for nearly three
decades; 28 nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Cunningham was not

Id. This group of sentencing terms is known as a "triad." Id.
The base term of a determinate sentence is the lower, middle, or upper term of the sentencing triad.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 3 (referring to the mitigated term, the middle term, and the aggregated term).
20. Id. ("Conduct enhancements relate to the way the crime was committed.").
21. Id. ("Status enhancements are imposed based on the history or position of the defendant at the time
the crime was committed.").
22. People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1247, 113 P.3d 534, 538 (2005).
23. "Circumstances in mitigation" include factors that relate to both the crime and the defendant. CAL.
R. CT. 4.423. Examples of mitigating factors that relate to the crime include that the defendant only passively
participated or was exceedingly cautious in executing the crime, or the victim willingly participated in or
initiated the incident. CAL. R. CT. 4.423(a). Examples of mitigating factors that relate to the defendant include
the lack of a criminal record, a mental or physical condition that reduced culpability, or early and voluntary
admission of wrongdoing. CAL. R. CT. 4.423(b). "Circumstances in aggravation" also include factors that relate
to both the crime and the defendant. CAL. R. CT. 4.421. Two examples of aggravating factors that relate to the
crime are that the crime was particularly cruel, vicious, callous, or violent, or that the defendant took advantage
of a particularly vulnerable victim. CAL. R. CT. 4.421(a). Two examples of aggravating factors that relate to the
defendant are a prior conviction or violent conduct indicating a danger to society. CAL. R. CT. 4.421(b).
24. See CAL. R. CT. 4.420(a) ("The middle term must be selected unless imposition of the upper or
lower term is justified by circumstances in aggravation or mitigation.").
25. Black, 35 Cal. 4th at 1247, 113 P.3d at 538.
26. CAL. R. CT. 4.420(b) (amended May 23, 2007).
27. Id. ("The relevant facts [in aggravating or mitigating circumstances] are included in the case record,
the probation officer's report, other reports and statements properly received, statements in aggravation or
mitigation, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing."); see also CAL. R. CT. 4.420(c)
(stating that a fact may not be charged and used as both an enhancement and a reason to impose the upper
term); CAL. R. CT. 4.420(d) ("A fact that is an element of the crime may not be used to impose the upper
term.").
28. See Black, 35 Cal. 4th at 1246, 113 P.3d at 537 ("California's determinate sentencing law became
operative on July 1, 1977, replacing the prior system under which most offenses carried an indeterminate
sentence."); 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 (stating that Chapter 3 was signed into law and filed on Mar. 30, 2007).
18.
19.
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wholly unexpected. 29 The Court viewed the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
jury trial to mean not only that the defendant has a right to present his or her case
to a jury, but also that the jury has a right to determine the aggravating
circumstance that justify a higher sentence. ° In 2000, the Court articulated this
view in a new line of cases in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.3
The first of these cases was Apprendi v. New Jersey.32 In Apprendi, the
defendant pled guilty to two weapons charges that would have resulted in a tenyear maximum sentence.33 The judge, however, sentenced the defendant to
twelve years after determining the existence of a hate-crime enhancement by a
preponderance of the evidence. 3- The Court in Apprendi held that New Jersey's
determinate sentencing law, which permitted the two-year increase, violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right: "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."35
Blakely v. Washington further developed this rule to define the statutory
maximum as the highest sentence that the defendant could receive based solely
36
on the jury's verdict or the defendant's guilty plea. In Blakely, the defendant
pled guilty to second degree kidnapping-with a presumptive term of forty-nine
to fifty-three months 37-but was sentenced to a ninety-month term after the judge
found evidence of deliberate cruelty.38 The Court held that the presumptive term,
rather than the maximum term set by the Washington Criminal Code, was the
statutory maximum.3 9

29. See Vikram David Amar, The Supreme Court Invalidates California's "Determinate Sentencing"
Law: Part One in a Two-Part Series on Yet More Cases Involving Judicial Factfinding in Sentencing, Feb. 2,
2007, http://writ.lp.findlaw.con/amar/20070202.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that
Cunningham is only one case in the Supreme Court's "growing list of Sixth Amendment cases involving - and
invalidating - certain state and federal sentencing schemes"); John Silva, Comment, Blakely v. Washington:
What do Past Cases Mean for California's Use of Enhancements and Aggravating Circumstances at
Sentencing?, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 227, 241 (2005) ("In light of Blakely, California will be forced to make...
changes to their determinate sentencing guidelines ....
30. Amar, supra note 29.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 3 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2005) [hereinafter MPC
SENTENCING].

32. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
33. Id. at 469-70.
34. Id. at 471.
35. Id. at 490.
36. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004) ("[Tjhe 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant ....[T]he relevant 'statutory maximum' ... [is] the maximum [the judge]
may impose without any additional findings." (citations omitted)).
37. Id. at 299.
38. Id. at 298.
39. Id. at 303-04 ("[T]he relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.").
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In United States v. Booker,40 the Supreme Court applied its Sixth Amendment
analysis to the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines to clarify4' whether
Blakely applied to the Guidelines." In a complicated decision, the Court issued
two opinions-each supported by a five-to-four majority. 3 First, Justice Stevens
presented the "merits opinion," which held the Guidelines unconstitutional
because of the judicial fact-finding used to justify an aggravated sentence.4'5 This
result-the application of the Blakely analysis to the Guidelines-was expected. 6
Justice Breyer delivered the unexpected "remedial opinion, 47 which made the
Guidelines advisory.4 ' The Justices agreed that advisory guidelines did not violate

40. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229-43 (2005).
41. Federal courts needed clarification as to whether Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines because, while new sentencing hearings poured into federal courts, a circuit-split emerged. See, e.g.,
United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2004) (certifying to the Supreme Court the question of
whether to apply Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because the "various attempts to implement
Blakely ultimately may prove misguided-or even wholly unnecessary [and] while these judicial approaches are
being litigated, defendants, victims, and the public will be left uncertain as to what sentences are lawful");
United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (determining that Blakely did not apply to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but acknowledging the likelihood that "the question presented in cases like this
one will soon receive a more definitive answer from the Supreme Court, which can resolve the current state of
flux and uncertainty"); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines "violate the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Blakely" while explicitly acknowledging
that the "Supreme Court [may] speedily reverse").
42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243. The Blakely opinion acknowledged that amicus curiae United States noted
the differences between Washington's sentencing scheme and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but expressly
stated that whether those differences were constitutionally significant was not an issue before the Court.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9.
43. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg); id. at 244 (Breyer, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg); MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 10 ("Remarkably, only Justice Ginsburg
joined both majorities. Eight Members of the Court were in sharp disagreement with one or another of the
Court's major rulings.").
44. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 11.
45. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243 ("All of the foregoing support our conclusion that our holding in Blakely
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Amar, supra note 29 ("[A]pplication of the Guidelines often
requires just the type of fact findings that Blakely held are unconstitutional: sentence-lengthening judge-made
fact findings. These judge-found facts (such as how much money was stolen, how many drugs were possessed,
etc.), combined with facts found by the jury or implicit in the guilty plea, determined which Guidelines
sentencing range (for example, [twenty to thirty] months) controlled each particular case.").
46. See MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 11 ("The merits opinion, for the most part, rehearsed the
reasoning of Blakely and produced a constitutional ruling that was anticipated by most observers.").
47. Id. at 11.
48. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 ("We answer the question of remedy by finding the provision of the federal
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory incompatible with today's constitutional holding....
So modified, the federal sentencing statute, as amended, makes the Guidelines effectively advisory." (citations
omitted)); see also Amar, supra note 29 ("In lieu of mandatory Guidelines, the Court stated, the Guideline
ranges would now operate as advisory only. U.S. district judges would still be required to calculate sentencing
ranges based on jury and judge-made factual findings, but would no longer be bound to impose a sentence in
that range. Instead, the Court held, the district judge's sentence must simply fall between the minimum and
maximum set out by Congress in the particular criminal statute, and should be upheld on appellate review so
long as it is 'reasonable."').

589
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defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, although the judge rather than
the jury decided whether to impose an aggravated sentence.49
In sum, the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence opposes the
use of presumptive terms that judicial fact-finding can overcome. 0 Yet the Sixth
Amendment permits indeterminate sentencing systems that give judges nearly
unlimited sentencing discretion within broad statutory ranges." Those two ideas
are reconciled through the concept of exposure: if a judge can increase a
presumptive term, a defendant is exposed to an unknown maximum sentence,
while if a judge only has discretion to sentence within a predetermined range, a
defendant is exposed to a known maximum sentence. The idea of exposure also
explains why it is theoretically possible "to require a sentence in the aggravated
range ... unless the trial court finds the absence of aggravating circumstances,"
because a jury determination is not constitutionally required if the sentence is
mitigated.52
In 2005, the defendant in People v. Black challenged California's sentencing
scheme in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.53 In Black, however, the California Supreme Court held that judicial
fact-finding to justify an upper term did not violate the Sixth Amendment.54 The
court denied Blakely's applicability to California's existing presumptive
sentencing scheme,55 emphasizing the scheme's flexibility.56 The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed.57

49. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 12 ("What Booker I [the merits opinion] bestowed under the
auspices of the Sixth Amendment, Booker H [the remedial opinion] took completely away.").
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 15 ("No jury determination is constitutionally necessary if [fact-finding] drive[s] punishment
downward rather than upward.").
53. See People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1246, 113 P.3d 534, 537 (2005) ("We granted review to
determine the effect of Blakely on the validity of the trial court's decisions to impose the upper term
sentence .... ").
54. Id. at 1244, 113 P.3d at 536.
55. Id. at 1254, 113 P.3d at 543 ("[A] trial court's imposition of an upper term sentence does not violate
a defendant's right to ajury trial under the principles set forth in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.").
56. Id. at 1255, 113 P.3d at 543-44.
Under the California scheme, a judge is free to base an upper term sentence on any aggravating
factor that the judge deems significant, subject to specific prohibitions .... The judge's discretion to
identify aggravating factors in a case is guided by the requirement that they be "reasonably related to
the decision being made." Thus, section 1170, subdivision (b)'s requirement that the middle term be
imposed unless an aggravating factor is found preserves the traditional broad range of judicial
sentencing discretion. Although subdivision (b) is worded in mandatory language, the requirement
that an aggravating factor exist is merely a requirement that the decision to impose the upper term be
reasonable.
Id. (citation omitted).
57. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007) ("Contrary to the Black court's holding, our
decisions from Apprendi to Booker point to the middle term specified in California's statutes, not the upper
term, as the relevant statutory maximum.").
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C. Cunningham v. California
In Cunningham v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held California's
sentencing scheme nearly indistinguishable from the sentencing schemes
invalidated in Blakely and Booker.58 When the jury in Cunningham found the
defendant guilty of continuous sexual abuse against a minor-a conviction that
would have resulted in a presumptive twelve-year term-the judge found
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed a sixteen-year
term.59 Just as in Blakely, the Court held that the presumptive term was the
relevant statutory maximum. 6° Thus, California's determinate sentencing law
violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right because aggravating facts that
potentially warranted an increased sentence were "found by the judge, not the
jury, and need only be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, not
'6
beyond a reasonable doubt. '
III. CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3 is California's response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Cunningham v. California.62 The statute took effect immediately in March 2007
as an urgency measure, 63 and is designed to stabilize California's criminal justice
system while the Legislature reviews California's sentencing structure. 64
Chapter 3 aims to comply with the Sixth Amendment 6 by deleting the
language in California's determinate sentencing law that directed courts to
impose the middle term absent aggravating or mitigating factors.66 Judicial
discretion to choose the appropriate term-lower, middle, or upper 67-replaced
the presumptive imposition of the middle term of imprisonment. 68 The decision is
left entirely to the judge's discretion and is not dependent upon the establishment

58. Id. at 858.
59. Id. at 860.
60. Id. at 868.
61. Id.
62. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § 1.
63. Kenneth Ofgang, Governor Approves Changes to California Sentencing Law, METRO. NEWSENTER. (Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking07/SB40.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing SB 40 as a "bill, which takes effect immediately as an urgency
measure"); 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 ("Approved by Governor March 30, 2007. Filed with Secretary of State March
30, 2007.").
64. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, §1.
65. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, supra note 5, at 2.
66. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (amended by Chapter 3) ("When a judgment of imprisonment is to
be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the
sound discretion of the court.").
67. Id. § 1170.3(a)(2) (enacted and amended by Chapter 3).
68. Id. § I170(b) (amended by Chapter 3) (further stating that the interests of justice drive the courts'
discretion).
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of any specific standard of proof. 69 However, the judge must state a reason for his
or her sentencing decision. °
An additional feature of Chapter 3 monitors the effects of the new advisory
sentencing policy on convicted felons.' Biannually, beginning in July 2007, the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) must update its
website with current information on the number of felons sentenced to the upper
term.72
The California Judicial Council is responsible for advising the Legislature,
on or before January 1, 2008, of the effect and consequences of Chapter 3's
implementation.73 This includes, but is not limited to, a revision of California's
Rules of Court." Chapter 3 also contains a sunset provision, 75 meaning without
further legislative action to extend it, Chapter 3 remains in effect only until
January 1, 2009.76
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER

3

California's options for responding to Cunningham were limited: the
Legislature had to either give the fact-finding role in the determinate system to
the jury or increase judicial discretion.77 According to Chapter 3's author, the bill
did little more than codify the second option7 ' by raising the statutory maximum
from the presumptive middle term to the upper term.79 Chapter 3 increases

69. Id. (amended by Chapter 3).
70. Id. § 1170(c) (amended by Chapter 3).
71. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § 6(a). The first report, released July 2007, contained annual data as of June 30,
2007. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., NUMBER OF FELONS ADMISSION WITH A FLAG FOR THOSE WHO
RECEIVED AT LEAST ONE UPPER TERM SENTENCE WHOSE ADMISSION TO ADULT CDCR WAS WITHIN THE

CALENDAR YEAR 2007, at 1 (2007), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInformation_
ServicesBranch/AnnuallUpperTerm/UpperTermdO7O6.pdf [hereinafter CDCR REPORT] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). The chart broke down by gender the felon admissions with and without an upper term.
Id. Of the 4,045 female felon admissions, 367 (nine percent) were admitted with an upper term. Id. Of the
30,345 male felon admissions, 3,426 (11.3 percent) were admitted with an upper term. Id. Cumulatively, of the
34,390 felon admissions, 3,793 (eleven percent) were admitted with an upper term. IdL
72. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § 6. Presumably, the Legislature wanted to track whether there is actually a
correlation between an increase in judicial discretion and an increase in disparity of sentences by tracking the
number of upper term sentences imposed.
73. Id. § 6(b).
74. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 4.420 (amended May 23, 2007) (updating California's Rules of Court to
reflect the new sentencing law under Chapter 3 rather than the past law declared unconstitutional under
Cunningham).
75. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 6 (Mar. 27, 2007).
76. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170(h), 1170.3(c) (enacted by Chapter 3).
77. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007) (presenting California with two options to
make its sentencing scheme constitutional: (1) require juries to find any fact used to increase a sentence from
the presumptive term, or (2) increase the judge's discretion to determine an appropriate sentence from a
statutory range).
78. Id.
79. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007).
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judicial discretion by removing the requirement that judges rely on additional
findings before altering a sentence. 0 Not everyone felt the second option was the
correct one-a small but vocal opposition found California's legislative remedy
ineffective and possibly unconstitutional."
A. Why Not Codify the First Option?
It was not a foregone conclusion that California would remedy its sentencing
scheme with increased judicial discretion.82 Post-Blakely, states with presumptive
sentencing guidelines favored the first option-allowing the trial jury or a
bifurcated jury83 to determine any aggravating sentencing factors beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 This approach, pioneered by the Kansas Legislature in 2002,
is known as "'Blakelyization.' 5 Blakelyization attracts states where non-jury
proceedings impose the majority of sentences.86 For such states, Blakelyization is
cost effective because the additional jury requirement applies to so few cases.87
According to the American Law Institute, this approach "should be the preferred
option among jurisdictions that have realized important gains through the
implementation of sentencing reforms." 8
As of 2005, only one state decided against Blakelyization-Tennessee. 9
California followed Tennessee's lead. 90 Chapter 3's author opposed
Blakelyization because the issue of whether a bifurcated jury would be required

80. Id.
81. Jeff Adachi, SB 40 Will Not "Fix" California's Sentencing Scheme and is Unconstitutional, Mar. 26,
2007, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2007/03/sb_40_will not.html [hereinafter Adachi, SB 40 Will
Not "Fix"] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
82. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 29, at 241 (listing other possible remedies to a Sixth Amendment
violation: holding a single jury trial or a bifurcated jury trial to determine aggravating factors, or imposing the
same penalty on every defendant convicted of an offense regardless of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances).
83. A bifurcated trial contains two phases: a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. Id.
84. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 20.
85. Id. at 20. The approach worked well in Kansas. Id. at 20-21. The state did not experience significant
disruption because such a small percentage of cases went to trial and the new procedures did not require very
much additional time. Id. at 20-21 n.65.
86. Id. at 21 ("The attraction of Blakelyization is greatest in jurisdictions that anticipate they will not
have to make use of jury sentencing proceedings very often.").
87. Id. at 21-22; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The
Court can announce that the Constitution requires at least two jury trials for each criminal defendant-one for
guilt, another for sentencing-but only because it knows full well that more than [ninety percent] of defendants
will not go to trial even once, much less insist on two or more trials.").
88. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 22.
89. Id. at 24 (stating that Tennessee chose Bookerization rather than Blakelyization when it "jettison[ed]
formerly presumptive guidelines in favor of an advisory system in order to bypass Sixth Amendment
requirements at sentencing").
90. See infra Part 1V.B (describing that California selected Bookerization over Blakelyization as a Sixth
Amendment repair to its sentencing scheme).
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for sentencing would be hotly contested. 9' Such a bifurcation would "add
substantial costs to an already overburdened court system., 92 As a result of
budgetary constraints, judges might not grant bifurcated trials, which could lead
to the prosecutor presenting evidence of aggravating factors to the same jury that
determined guilt or innocence. 93 Such a practice could be highly prejudicial to the
defendant and would increase the number of appeals and possible reversals by
appellate courts. 4 Chapter 3's author also argued that the increase in judicial
discretion would "place[] no additional burden on the courts, the defendant or the
prosecutor." 95

In an unusual political alignment, however, Republican Senator McClintock
joined Democratic Senator Migden and opposed Chapter 3.96 McClintock argued
that Chapter 3 should have provided for bifurcated sentencing proceedings to
98
97
ensure compliance with the Sixth Amendment. Other Chapter 3 opponents
similarly supported Blakelyization for several reasons. 99 First, the Supreme Court
approved Blakelyization as a solution to California's sentencing problems."
Second, the fundamental and constitutional right to a jury trial would be
protected, and aggravating factors would be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' °'
Lastly, if Kansas served as any indicator, California's sentencing 10system
would
2
not be overburdened by additional time required by such jury trials.

91. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 4-5 (Mar. 26, 2007).
92. Id. at 4; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 319 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If a legislature desires uniform
consideration of such factors at sentencing, but does not want them to impact a jury's initial determination of
guilt, the State may have to bear the additional expense of a separate, full-blown jury trial during the penalty
phase proceeding."); id. at 336 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Our experience with bifurcated trials in the capital
punishment context suggests that requiring them for run-of-the-mill sentences would be costly, both in money
and in judicial time and resources.").
93. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 4 (Mar. 26, 2007).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Ofgang, supra note 63.
97. Id.
98. Jeff Adachi, SB 40: The Prison Reform Battle Continues in California!, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.
californiaprogressreport.comI2007/04/sb_40_the_priso.html [hereinafter Adachi, Battle Continues] (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the Office of Public Defender, City and County of San Francisco, Dr.
Cayenne Bird, United for No Injustice, Oppression or Neglect (UNION), the California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, Assembly Members Mark Leno, Sandre Swanson, Loni Hancock, Chuck Devore, and Fiona Ma, and
Senators Tom McClintock and Carole Migden oppose Chapter 3).
99. See infra notes 100-02 (describing the benefits of Blakelyization).
100. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 n.18 (2007) (expressly approving Tennessee's
approach to increase judicial discretion so a judge can impose any term within a statutory range): see also MPC
SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 24 (describing Tennessee's approach as "Bookerization").
101. Id.
102. See MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 20 (describing the effects of Blakelyization on Kansas'
sentencing system as minimal, due to the small number of criminal cases affected, of which most are resolved
with pleas).
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One of the first post-Cunningham appeals, however, explicitly supported the
Legislature's decision.0 3 In People v. Sandoval, the California Supreme Court
held that while Blakelyization would comply with the Sixth Amendment, the
existing system was not compatible with that approach: neither the determinate
sentencing scheme nor the Rules of Court contemplated the use of a jury to
determine aggravating factors."" Problems might arise if prosecutors did not
know how to charge and try the factors to a jury, and no comprehensive list of
such factors exists.' 5 The court concluded, "engrafting a jury trial onto the
sentencing process established in the former [determinate sentencing
law] would
'' 6
scheme."
sentencing
the
distort
and
complicate
significantly
B. CaliforniaChose Bookerization
If Blakelyization was the most popular legislative response for states with
presumptive guidelines, "'Bookerization"' became "[t]he most celebrated
'avoidance' technique."'0 7 This approach emerged after Booker articulated that
judicial fact-finding did not implicate the Sixth Amendment when sentencing
guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory.' 8 This route circumvents the
Court's developing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. "9
Democratic Senator Gloria Romero, a vocal proponent of prison reform,
authored Chapter 3. "0 Along with other Democrats, she promoted Chapter 3 as a
103. See People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal. 4th 825, 848, 161 P.3d 1146, 1160-61 (2007) ("Resentencing under
such a discretionary scheme is preferable to the alternative of maintaining the requirement that the middle term
be imposed in the absence of aggravating or mitigating factors but permitting a jury trial on aggravating
circumstances.").
104. Id. at 848-49, 161 P.3d at 1161 (explaining why permitting a jury trial on aggravating factors is
incompatible with California's existing sentencing system).
105. Id.
106. Id.at 848, 161 P.3d at 116.
107. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 23; see also id. at 18-19 (stating that avoidance remodels a
sentencing system to escape Blakely through one of the Sixth Amendment exceptions in the case law, as
opposed to compliance, which modifies the existing system to satisfy the Blakely requirements of a jury trial);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 320 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("To the extent that [states do not
elect to bear the costs of jury trials to determine aggravating factors], there will be an inevitable increase in
judicial discretion with all of its attendant failings.").
108. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 305 (2005) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court) (finding an
exception to the Sixth Amendment violation if the Federal Guidelines were advisory); id. at 233 (Stevens, J.,
opinion of the Court) (finding that if the Guidelines were advisory, "their use would not implicate the Sixth
Amendment"); id. at 259-60 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court) (finding that the constitutional issue would have
been avoided if the Guidelines were not binding); see also MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 23 ("Booker
tells us that judicial factfinding under an advisory guidelines system slips past Blakely's Sixth Amendment rule
109. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 24. The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is
largely composed of five-to-four decisions. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 465, 466 (2000);
Blakely, 542 U.S. 296; Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
110. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 1 (Mar. 27, 2007) (stating that
Gloria Romero authored the bill); B. Cayenne Bird, Say NO to SB40 - A Sidestep that Takes Away Prisoners'
Hope, AM. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.americanchronicle.comlarticles/viewArticle.asp?articlelD=
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"stopgap measure" for long-term prison reform-a temporary remedy--complete
with a sunset provision."' Senator Romero argued the stability that Chapter 3
provides to the sentencing system enables the Legislature to create a sentencing
commission to review California's complex sentencing practices" 2 and to
recommend permanent changes." 3 Further, the legislative intent of Chapter 3
characterized the bill as a response to Cunningham because it will maintain
stability in the criminal
justice system while the Legislature reviews the
4
sentencing structure."
The bill's quick passage, however, became a source of contention."' Chapter
3 went into effect"6 only two months after the Supreme Court decided
Cunningham."' Nearly every member of both houses voted for the bill,"' and the
Governor signed it into law without delay." 9 Governor Schwarzenegger
commended the Legislature for the bill's prompt passage 20 and initially
supported a sentencing commission in the 2007 budget.12' Proponents of Chapter
3122 were also pleased with the quick legislative response and showered the bill
with accolades. 23 One group suggested removing the sunset provision to make

21930 [hereinafter Bird, Say NO] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing Gloria Romero as a
"heroine in prison reform").
111. Ofgang, supra note 63 (describing Chapter 3 as a stopgap measure); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h),
1170.3(c) (enacted by Chapter 3).
112. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 160, at 2 (May 21,
2007). California sentencing is described as "Byzantine and arbitrary," disparate and ineffective, "complex and
confusing." ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 110, at 6-7 (July 2,
2007). More than a thousand felony-sentencing laws and one hundred felony sentence enhancements are
scattered throughout twenty-one sections of the California codes. Id.
113. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007).
114. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § 1.
115. See infra notes 126-27 (criticizing the bill's quick passage).
116. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 ("Approved by Governor March 30, 2007. Filed with Secretary of State March
30, 2007.").
117. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). Cunningham was decided on January 22, 2007.
Id.
118. Only five Assembly Members and two Senators voted against Chapter 3. ASSEMBLY FLOOR,
UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 26, 2007) (listing DeVore, Hancock, Leno, Ma, and Swanson as voting against
Chapter 3); SENATE FLOOR, UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 28, 2007) (listing McClintock and Migden as voting
against Chapter 3).
119. 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 ("Approved by Governor March 30, 2007. Filed with Secretary of State March
30, 2007.").
120. Ofgang, supra note 63.
121. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cal. State Governor, Transcript of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's
Remarks at State Budget Release Press Conference, Jan. 10, 2007, http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/speech5116/
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
122. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 9 (Mar. 27, 2007). Among
proponents are the California Attorney General, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, California
District Attorney's Association, California Police Chiefs Association, California Peace Officers Association,
Chief Probation Officers of California, San Bernardino County Sheriff, and Crime Victims United. Id.
123. See, e.g., id. at 10 ("California's sentencing scheme will once again function as it was designed to
do.").
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Chapter 3 "more than just a 'temporary fix.""'2 4 The group reasoned that since
Chapter 3 "repaired the law, there is no principled justification to 'break' it again
25
by imposing a sunset provision that will undo this much-needed legislation."
Opponents, on the other hand, accused legislators of drastically changing
sentencing law with Chapter 3, 26"moving rapidly to get it approved before much
opposition [could] mount.""' Critics contended that because most criminal cases
in California are resolved by non-jury disposition, such as plea-bargains or
dismissal, Chapter 3 is not needed to maintain stability for the remaining cases
that are affected by Cunningham.21 Moreover, uniformity is elusive when some
judges sentence defendants to upper terms, while other judges do not. 2 9 Jeff
Adachi, the only elected public defender in California, 3 ° commented that a
which is only
defendant's fate is often determined by "the luck of the draw,"
3
1
sentence.
to
discretion
complete
judges
giving
compounded by
A spokesperson for the group United for No Injustice, Oppression or Neglect
(UNION) not only criticized Chapter 3, but also expressed disappointment with
its author, a politician known for her role in prison reform.132 The general
consensus among opponents was that Chapter 3 was merely a quick fix to the
constitutional issues addressed by Cunningham.3 Cunningham provided what
some saw as a perfect opportunity to address the persistent problems that plague
California's prison system3-an opportunity that Chapter 3 overlooked. 35
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Bird, Say NO,supra note 110 ("SB 40 ...drastically changes the determinate sentencing law and
gives judges power to sentence criminal defendants to aggravated terms without any jury findings.").
127. Bird, Kill this Bill, supranote 5 ("Why the rush? Such an expensive proposal deserves more debate
and scrutiny by the taxpayers in my opinion.").
128. Letter from Jeff Adachi, Public Defender, City & County of S.F., to Assembly Member Jose
Solorio, Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 6, 2007), in Bird, Say No, supra note 110 [hereinafter Letter from Adachi to
Solorio] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[A] person may voluntarily agree to receive the aggravated
prison term as part of a plea disposition, provided they waive any Cunningham issues. This waiver is now
standard for any case in which a plea to an aggravated term is contemplated.").
129. Id.
130. Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 (noting that Jeff Adachi is the only elected California public
defender).
131. Id.; see also Adachi, Battle Continues, supra note 98 (stating that Chapter 3 requires the CDCR to
biannually report the number of maximum sentences imposed by judges, which might expose those judges who
abuse their discretion). The first report issued by CDCR on July 1, 2007, was superficial, giving only the
numbers of maximum terms imposed out of the total number of terms imposed, broken down by gender. CDCR
REPORT, supra note 71, at 1.There is no indication that the maximum terms will be broken down by sentencing
judges. See id. (lacking any indication of further breakdown of the data).
132. Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 (noting that Chapter 3 was the first of Senator Romero's bills ever
to be opposed by UNION, Dr. Cayenne Bird said, "I hope that it is simply a mistake that [Senator Romero] is
taking this route to respond to the Supreme Court Ruling.").
133. Letter from Adachi to Solorio, supra note 128; see also Bird, Say NO, supra note 110 ("This bill
was hastily drafted to counter the Supreme Court's recent decision declaring California's sentencing law
unconstitutional.").
134. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, New Court to Address CaliforniaPrison Crowding, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2007, at A16 (stating that prison overcrowding is at a level that might necessitate a cap of the inmate
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C. Long-Term Effects of a Short-Term Solution
In hindsight, the Legislature's decision to address Cunningham's mandated
37
36
may have backfired.
sentencing changes and prison reform separately
Chapter 3 was expected, even intended, to have a counterpart in prison reform-a
sentencing commission.11 When Chapter 3 was passed, Democrats had Governor
Schwarzenegger's full support to create a sentencing commission; all that
remained was "to work out the details" and determine "how much teeth that
commission [would] have."' 3 9 Two months after Chapter 3 passed, however, the
Governor withdrew budgetary support for the sentencing commission and
diverted the commission's funding to build a new execution chamber at San
Quentin.' 40 The political leverage to create a sentencing commission began to

erode. 141
Chapter 3's Bookerization, while ideal for partnership with a sentencing
commission,' 42 was designed as a "stopgap measure."'' 43 Any effect Chapter 3 will

population, such that three-judge panels would be formed to determine the release of inmates).
135. See Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 (finding that after the Cunningham ruling "there was hope that
the legislature would do the right thing" and reform California's sentencing laws, but that "SB40 will dash that
hope").
136. Ofgang, supra note 63 (describing that Governor Schwarzenegger first commended the Legislature
for quickly passing SB 40 to clarify California's sentencing standards, and then stated that he "look[ed] forward
to working with the legislature" to reform California's prison system).
137. See infra notes 140-41 (describing the difficulties of implementing prison reform after Chapter 3's
passage).
138. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007) ("Until such time that a
sentencing commission (SB 110) can thoroughly perform its review, [Chapter 3] would bring desperately
needed stability to a court system that has been thrown into chaos by the [Cunningham] decision."); see also
MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 26-27 (stating that, although advisory guidelines are less certain in effect
than presumptive systems, the system gives a state the distinct advantage of allowing for a permanent
sentencing commission to better amend guidelines over time).
139. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cal. State Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Tours Overcrowded State
Prison in Norco, Mar. 6, 2007, http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/5568/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
140. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cal. State Governor, Governor Releases 2007 May Revision, May 14,
2007, http://www.gov.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/6226/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining
that the "people of California made it very clear that we go in the direction of capital punishment").
141. Compare Frank D. Russo, Covering the End of the California Legislative Session Has Many
Challenges and Yet is So Important, Sept. 9, 2007, http://www.californiaprogressreport.comI2007/09/
covering-the en.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the two proposed bills, SB 110 and
AB 160, that would have created a sentencing commission to deal with California's over-populated prisons),
with AB 160, 2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Sept. 7, 2007, but not enacted), and SB 110,
2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Aug. 31, 2007, but not enacted).
142. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 26-27.
An advisory guidelines system, while it may be weaker or less certain in its effects than a
presumptive system, still gives a state the important advantage of a permanent sentencing
commission with research responsibilities, the ability to generate correctional projections as needed
by policymakers, and a mandate to amend guidelines over time in response to judicial behavior, the
needs of the corrections system, and developing criminological knowledge.
Id.
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have as a more permanent solution to California's sentencing problems is
unknown.'" With the long-term solution of the sentencing commission on hold,
the Legislature may extend Chapter 3 past4 6 the original 2009 sunset.' 45 Chapter 3's
actual impact is more relevant thai1ever.1
4
Advisory sentencing financially impacts California's correction budget. 1
The cost of the transition from presumptive to advisory sentencing may cost
substantially more than additional jury fact-finding. 4 s The Assembly Committee
on Appropriations noted that the annual fiscal impact of Chapter 3 is likely
considerable. 49 The Committee acknowledged that while many judges,
prosecutors, and even defense attorneys did not believe Chapter 3 would
drastically change current sentencing practices,'s" advisory sentencing tends to
increase prison populations.' An increase in the number of offenders who
receive the upper term directly correlates to an increase in California's prison
population.' Even a relatively minor increase in the percentage of offenders
sentenced to the upper term would incur significant cost due to the large number
of offenders.' The Committee estimated Chapter 3 requires at least 5 thirteen
4
million dollars in additional funding for California's correctional budget.'

143. Ofgang, supra note 63.
144. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (summarizing the views of Chapter 3 opponents).
One possible solution to Cunningham might create additional problems.
145. See SENATE RULES COMMIrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 10 (Mar. 27, 2007)
(describing the California District Attorney's Association suggestion that Chapter 3 become a permanent rather
than a temporary fix to California's sentencing scheme).
146. See infra notes 147-59 (predicting that Chapter 3 could significantly impact California's correction
budget and increase the racial disparity in sentencing).
147. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 1-2 (Mar. 21,
2007).
148. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 24 ("On policy grounds, substantial costs may attend the
switch from presumptive to voluntary sentencing principles-especially from a state perspective.").
[Mlost states that have worked with presumptive sentencing guidelines have come to see them as
essential tools in the deliberate management of prison population growth, prioritization in how
prison bed spaces are allocated, and informed planning for the greater use of intermediate sanctions.
...In contrast, states that have employed voluntary sentencing guidelines have had a mixed record
in these "resource management" arenas. Half of the states using voluntary guidelines have
experienced rates of prison growth that outstrip national trends.
Id. at 25.
Although the issue of advisory guidelines will no doubt be raised in some states as well, it is
important to remember that state officials survey the landscape of sentencing reform from a wholly
different vantage point than federal officials .... Any swelling of support for Bookerization in the
federal system should not be extended without careful thought to state sentencing law.
Id. at 26.
149. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at I (Mar. 21,
2007).
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Letter from Adachi to Leno, supra note 8.
152. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 1-2 (Mar. 21,
2007).
153. Id.
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Advisory sentencing also potentially amplifies current racial inequities in
California's prisons. 5 In her Blakely dissent, Justice O'Connor noted the
transition to determinate sentencing in Washington-guided rather than unguided
discretion-correlated to a reduction in racial disparity. 56 She anticipated the
regression toward unguided discretion would correlate to an increase in racial
disparity in Washington once again. 5 7 Jeff Adachi suggested that racial
disparities in sentencing should be closely monitored 58 due to the "strong
probability that [Chapter 3] will result in minority defendants receiving the
highest sentence more often than white defendants."'59

For example, about 54,000 offenders are projected to receive determinate prison sentences in 200607. In 2006, about 10,000 persons sentenced to state prison received a sentence with an upper term.
Discounted by a [forty percent] estimate of sentences arrived at via plea, this figure is 6,000. At
$43,000 per capita, every [one percent] increase above the 6,000 will cost about $2.6 million. Using
2006 as a base, if SB 40 increases the number of offenders who receive aggravated terms in 2006 by
[five percent] (300 inmates), the cost would be about $13 million annually. (This is likely a
conservative estimate as it assumes the average sentence increase is only one year served, when
many existing sentencing triads contain aggravated terms several years greater than the presumptive
middle term.) Also, the number of offenders receiving upper base terms could decrease, though
discussions with practitioners suggest there is little reason to believe any increase in the number of
lower term sentences will offset the increase in upper term sentences.
Id.
154. Id. at 1. Chapter 3's opponents suggest that the budget will increase by much more than $13
million. See, e.g., Letter from Adachi to Leno, supra note 8 (estimating a budget increase of "at least $193.5
million"); Bird, Kill this Bill, supra note 5 (estimating the budget increase to be in the "hundreds of millions of
dollars").
155. Adachi, SB 40 Will Not "Fix," supra note 81; see also Letter from Adachi to Leno, supra note 8
("The Human Rights Watch Report, 'Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System,' found that when
sentenced for drug offenses in state court, whites serve an average of 27 months while blacks serve an average
of 46 months. Thus blacks and other minorities are more likely to receive aggravated sentences than their white
counterparts. Racial disparities in the criminal justice system have become such the norm that would-be
startling statistics regarding sentencing disparities between white defendants and minority defendants are oft
times quickly passed over without a second glance.").
156. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315-19 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 315 ("This [former indeterminate sentencing] of unguided discretion inevitably resulted in
severe disparities. . . . [and] rather than reflect legally relevant criteria, these disparities too often were
correlated with constitutionally suspect variables such as race.").
158. Adachi, Battle Continues, supra note 98.
159. Adachi, SB 40 Will Not "Fix," supra note 81.
For over a decade academics have concluded less constrained judicial decision-making may lead to
unjustifiable reliance on unstated biases in determining a defendant's sentence. At least two legal
scholars Albonetti (1991), and Steffensmeier et al. (1998) have described how judges, when
equipped with limited information for assessing a defendant's criminal propensity, may act on their
own preconceptions. Consequently, those defendants who possess undesirable extralegal
characteristics such as lower social and economic status are sentenced more harshly.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

While Chapter 3 addresses the Sixth Amendment violation in California's
determinate sentencing law, it does little more than that.'" Chapter 3 may not
significantly alter California's sentencing scheme absent long-term sentencing
reform. 6' California's Legislature designed Chapter 3 to work in conjunction
with a sentencing commission' 62 that would address issues that extend far beyond
Cunningham to issues like prison overcrowding.' 63 However, that sentencing
commission was not passed with Chapter 3.'64
Chapter 3 can likely maintain the status quo, but "piecemeal reform always
creates a risk that it will patch up the system, allowing it to function, but still
badly."'' 65 Further, because advisory guidelines are unenforceable, the system
"must work harder to gain the results that presumptive guidelines regularly
achieve." '66 Bookerization may still prove effective as long as: (1) the Legislature
rapidly creates the promised sentencing commission;' 67 (2) the commission is
able to implement a long-term, non-partisan, effective and constitutional
sentencing scheme in California; and (3) the effects of Chapter 3 do not conflict
68
with the Legislature's intent to keep sentencing disparities to a minimum.'

160. See 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, § I (stating that Chapter 3 will stabilize California's criminal justice
system while sentencing structures are reviewed). Implicit in Chapter 3's purpose is that any prison reform
beyond the immediate Sixth Amendment response is left to a counterpart bill-a sentencing commission.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007).
161. Post-Cunningham, one court has already affirmed this position, finding that changes caused by
Bookerization would be insubstantial and "as a practical matter would not substantially alter the [determinate
sentencing law] as initially adopted by the Legislature." People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal. 4th 825, 850, 852, 161 P.3d
1146, 1162, 1164 (2007). The court also believed the increase in judicial discretion would not "undermine the
legislative goals of establishing proportionate sentences and reducing disparity." Id. at 850, 161 P.3d at 1162.
162. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 40, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2007) (describing that
California's sentencing scheme needs to be reviewed by a sentencing commission, but that Chapter 3 brings
needed stability to that scheme "[u]ntil such time that a sentencing commission (SB 110) can thoroughly
perform its review").
163. See Moore, supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing the reality of prison overcrowding
in California and the responsive measures being taken to alleviate that problem).
164. AB 160, 2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Sept. 7, 2007, but not enacted); SB
110, 2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Aug. 31, 2007, but not enacted).
165. Letter from Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Dean, Univ. of Pac., McGeorge Sch. of Law, and Michael
Vitiello, Professor & Scholar, Univ. of Pac., McGeorge Sch. of Law, to Camilla Kieliger, Admin. Coordinator,
Cal. State Judicial Council (July 24, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
166. MPC SENTENCING, supra note 31, at 25.
167. See, e.g., AB 160, 2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Sept. 7, 2007, but not
enacted); SB 110, 2007 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (as amended Aug. 31, 2007, but not enacted).
Although a sentencing commission was not created in 2007, SB 110 is slated for reconsideration. CURRENT
BILL STATUS, S.B. NO. 110 (Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that SB 110 will be
reconsidered in the Assembly).
168. See People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal. 4th 825, 850, 161 P.3d 1146, 1162 (2007) (stating that the
California Supreme Court believed that Chapter 3's increase in judicial discretion over sentencing would not
conflict with the Legislature's goals to reduce sentencing disparity).

